For residents of South Africa’s metropolitan municipalities, the run-up to the 2026 local government elections is shaping up to deliver something familiar and unwelcome: councils in which no party holds a majority, and where the people who ultimately decide who runs their cities are party negotiators rather than voters themselves.
That is the picture painted by Oxford Economics Africa, whose polling forecasts no outright majority nationally and in six of the country’s eight metros. The result, the research body argues, will be a turbulent post-election period of intense coalition bargaining, with the governance of numerous municipalities decided in backroom talks rather than at the ballot box. Its assessment aligns with a broader consensus among independent research bodies and polling institutions that coalition governments are becoming a permanent structural feature of local government, not a temporary phase.
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The mechanics behind these so-called hung councils are straightforward: when no single party wins 50% plus 1% of the seats, parties must negotiate power-sharing agreements. What is driving that outcome, according to the briefing, is the steady decline of the ANC’s electoral majority alongside a growing proliferation of smaller, fragmented parties. Political backing for the ANC is collapsing, the report states, yet voters are not pivoting to the DA, the country’s primary opposition party. Instead, the electorate is splintering across smaller factions, with the ANC’s decline primarily fuelling the rise of leftist alternatives such as the EFF and the MKP.
The numbers tell the story of a decade of political shifting. Between 2011 and 2021, the ANC’s national vote share fell from 64.8% to 45.6%, while the DA climbed from 16.2% to 21.6%, peaking at 27.4% in 2016. That decline cost the ANC vital metros. “The end of the ANC’s hegemony and the fragmentation of support for parties on both ends of the political spectrum mean fewer municipalities have been won outright; a trend that is set to continue in 2026. The situation is most pronounced in urban centres, but it is also becoming more common in some rural areas,” the report reads.
Meanwhile, the briefing describes the upcoming elections as unfolding against the backdrop of a weakening and increasingly erratic ANC, one plagued by deep-seated factionalism and internal structural hurdles that have severely crippled its traditionally powerful electoral apparatus. Its subdued campaign effort stems from severe funding shortages and a depleted budget, while a decade of shrinking electoral support has reduced the number of available patronage positions, intensifying political rivalry at municipal level. The party also failed to announce its mayoral candidates in August, despite widening its nomination process and promising voters the “best on offer”.
For communities in the country’s divided metropolitan areas, including Nelson Mandela Bay and the Gauteng metros, the decisions made in coalition talks will heavily shape daily governance and the national political landscape alike. “Here, the ANC and DA will be forced to make a difficult and hugely consequential decision: do they go in search of other major coalition partners or do they partner with each other? The ANC has the advantage here, as it could partner with the EFF, PA, ActionSA, and other smaller parties. By contrast, the DA has few coalition options, as its most reliable traditional partners, the IFP and VF+, are not projected to win enough votes to help it achieve a collective majority,” the report states.
Political analyst Professor Theo Neethling offers a provincial breakdown of what residents can expect. The ANC is likely to remain relatively strong in parts of the Eastern Cape, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and the North West, where historical loyalty, established party structures and the party’s liberation legitimacy still play a role, though that does not guarantee former levels of dominance everywhere. In KwaZulu-Natal, the emergence of the MK Party and the enduring presence of the IFP have fundamentally altered the balance of power. In Gauteng, specifically Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni, the ANC’s position is threatened by poor service delivery, perceptions of corruption and strong opposition challenges. The Western Cape remains the DA’s primary power base, and its ability to expand beyond traditional strongholds will matter greatly to its national ambitions.
Neethling also cautions that local results should not be read as a dependable forecast for the 2029 national elections. Municipal votes, he notes, reflect immediate community frustrations, service delivery issues and the quality of local candidates rather than broader national voting patterns, even as they offer a strong sign of political direction. What the 2026 elections will indicate, he adds, is whether South Africa’s political system is settling into a new balance of power, one in which coalitions rather than single-party governance become the standard form of administration.