Kremlin readies third Russia-Africa Summit as accountability questions mount

Moscow’s institutional machinery is preparing its third structured engagement with the African continent, and the accountability questions it raises are becoming harder to ignore. On 28 and 29 October, the Kremlin will host the Russia-Africa Summit, together with an accompanying forum expected to draw more than 2,000 participants. According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, most countries have already confirmed attendance. Following earlier gatherings in Sochi in 2019 and St Petersburg in 2023, Vladimir Putin will again welcome African delegations, this time with a package of concrete proposals covering air defence, counter-drone systems, military cooperation, nuclear energy and cybersecurity.

The formal programme assigns roles that signal Moscow’s priorities. On 28 October, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will meet African foreign ministers. The following day, Putin is expected to co-chair the plenary session alongside Burundi’s President Evariste Ndayishimiye, the current Chairperson of the African Union. But the decisions that matter most, officials and analysts suggest, will be made in bilateral meetings, where Russia intends to negotiate further military, energy and economic agreements with individual governments.

At the centre of the offer sits Rosoboronexport, the state arms exporter, which plans to present its new Anti-Drone Dome system. The system is designed to protect military facilities, critical infrastructure, transport convoys and government buildings against unmanned aerial vehicles, integrating radar, electronic warfare, automated command and control, and counter-drone weapons. Russia also intends to market the Pantsir-S1M, Pantsir-SMD-E and Verba man-portable air defence systems, alongside other technologies from its defence industry. The pitch responds to a real demand: many African governments face terrorism, armed and rebel groups, and increasingly frequent drone use by terrorist organisations. Moscow intends to draw on its wartime experience against Ukraine to promote these systems, although the effectiveness of Russian weaponry remains contested, given Moscow’s documented difficulties in shielding its own bases and energy infrastructure from Ukrainian strikes.

The Russian state’s security footprint on the continent is also being reorganised under formal ministerial control. Operations once conducted by the Wagner Group are gradually being absorbed by Africa Corps, which answers to the Russian Ministry of Defence. Russian personnel remain present in countries including Mali, Libya and the Central African Republic, providing training, operational support and protection for local authorities. The scale of this institutional engagement is considerable: by March 2026, Russia had concluded nearly 60 military cooperation agreements covering 39 African countries, and between 2020 and 2025 Russian warships made more than 65 port visits to at least 18 African states, showing activity well beyond the Sahel.

Meanwhile, state-owned Rosatom, the summit’s title sponsor, plans to sign new documents on nuclear energy cooperation. Moscow is promoting nuclear power plants, floating reactors and long-term technological partnerships. These agreements, which bundle construction with nuclear fuel supplies, specialist training, maintenance and technical support, could lock African partners into dependency for decades. Russia is already building a nuclear power plant in Egypt. The official programme also includes cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and so-called digital sovereignty, including a session with Rosoboronexport on protecting state institutions, countering what Moscow calls colour revolutions, and controlling national information environments. For some governments, including authoritarian ones, technologies that monitor populations and control information flows may hold obvious appeal, but they raise serious concerns about political surveillance and the reach of Russian intelligence services.

Europe, by contrast, holds far greater economic weight. Trade in goods between the EU and Africa reached almost 355 billion euros in 2024, and the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package aims to mobilise up to 150 billion euros. The seventh European Union-African Union Summit took place in November 2025. The problem is not Europe’s absence but its effectiveness in converting economic cooperation into political influence and security partnerships. Russia commands fewer resources yet concentrates its efforts on selected countries, particularly in the Sahel, on military institutions, and on sectors where long-term relationships can be built.

The summit will not decide the continent’s future. African states pursue varied interests and engage not only with Moscow but with Beijing, Washington and Europe. Still, Russia demonstrates once again that it grasps the value of regular political engagement: arms deliveries lead to training, advisers open negotiations over access to bases, and nuclear projects create decades-long dependencies. Europe will not blunt Russian influence with statements alone; it needs competitive offers of military cooperation, training, investment and a consistent political presence. Moscow is not waiting for the war in Ukraine to end before consolidating its position in Africa. The question Europe must answer is why it should.