For the African entrepreneurs and business figures packing for Moscow this late October, the 3rd Russia-Africa summit carries a familiar promise and a familiar frustration. They will arrive, as their predecessors did, looking for corporate bilateral economic deals. What they are likely to encounter, according to one of Russia’s most closely followed voices on the continent, is a set of expected arrangements that remain blissfully complicated, because potential Russian investors, both state and private, grossly lack appropriate financial mechanisms.
That assessment comes from Professor Irina Abramova, director of the Institute for African Studies, who spent a couple of months in text exchanges exploring the obstacles impeding Russia-Africa economic cooperation and Russia’s inability to make practical investments across Africa. In an interview text posted to the Institute’s website, she laid out the situation with unusual directness.
“The development of Russian industry depends on how we interact,” Abramova said. “We are talking and repeating about developing technology, developing industry, and not becoming a raw materials appendage of the West.” What Russia lacks, in practical terms, is coordination, and that systemic coordination and consistency, she argued, are crucial to realizing Russia’s policy goals in Africa.
Her verdict on past gatherings was pointed. She described the previous African leaders’ meetings in 2019 and 2023 as a “summit-fest,” occasions during which Russia and African countries signed several bilateral agreements and posed for group photographs, while the degree to which Russia’s primary economic and investment interests in Africa were actually served remained an open question. The first summit drew 49 leaders. The second, 17 presidents.
The numbers behind her skepticism are stark. “Russia’s trade stands at $27 billion, then with Europe almost $400 billion while China has $300 billion,” she said. “We don’t finance, and with money Africans understand Russia can’t provide under the current circumstances.” Even the tools that exist on paper struggle in practice. “We all know the term public-private-partnership, but it turns out that Russian businesses, accustomed to opening differently, are struggling to invest in Africa. They’re waiting for government loans, expecting state-controlled support for years.”
There is a longer story behind this gap. In the past, Russia’s interest sat at Africa’s periphery while it seemed to be trying to integrate itself into the Western world. In December 2023, however, a new Russian foreign policy was adopted, one that included a detailed section dedicated to Africa. Since the sudden collapse of the Soviet era, Russia has been undergoing a major transformation, yet the political dialogue between Moscow and Africa’s capitals has been maintained throughout, creating the foundation for reshaping a new policy agenda. That continuity is now reflected in current relations with the continent, with regional blocs and with the African Union.
Russia frames its approach in terms Africans themselves have put on the table. Africa aims at consolidating its independence and economic sovereignty, and Russia, drawing on its own historical foundation, urges African states to pursue an independent foreign policy and overcome their colonial legacy. Moscow welcomes the fact that African countries are becoming important decision-making centres, that their economic and political influence is growing, and that African states are actively shaping their own approaches to international security, trade, development and the reform of the global financial system. Russia unwaveringly believes African states must determine for themselves with whom and in which areas they wish to cooperate, advocating a multipolar world and fairer representation for African countries in international institutions, first and foremost the United Nations.
The summit itself, to be held on 28-29 October 2026 in Moscow, follows Sochi in 2019 and St Petersburg in July 2023. Its priority areas are familiar. Trade and investment are to grow not only through the supply of specific products but through joint ventures, industrial cooperation, localisation and investment. Energy cooperation would involve not only the construction of power stations but the training of specialists and the development of a scientific and regulatory framework, expertise Russia believes African states will find particularly sought after. Food and energy security matter because Africa needs stable supplies of food, fertilisers and energy resources, areas where Russia has significant capabilities. Education, science and technology remain, in Russia’s traditional view, among the most reliable ways to foster long-term partnership; if an African country receives not only equipment but specialists capable of independently using and developing the relevant technologies, the benefits will endure for decades. On security, African states determine their own needs while Russia stands ready to provide training, expertise and technology, particularly against terrorism, transnational crime and other threats spreading across West Africa and the Sahel. The international agenda rounds this out: both sides advocate strengthening the role of the UN, reforming international financial institutions, enhancing the role of developing countries in global decision-making, and opposing unilateral sanctions mechanisms that hinder world trade.
Whether the deal-seekers arriving in Moscow find more than photographs this time may depend on institutions as much as intentions. A new Department for Partnership with Africa has been created at the Foreign Ministry, assigned expanded diplomatic capabilities and responsibility for supervising prompt implementation of agreements. Under the Action Plan of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum for 2023-2026, both sides are expected to hold constructive positions on bilateral ties and implement, with vigour, agreements signed during the first and second summits, particularly in the economic sectors across Africa.
Meanwhile, Russia also seeks institutional dialogue beyond individual states, with Regional Associations and the African Union. In July 2026, the African Union Commission and Russia reaffirmed the need to strengthen cooperation, including sectorial dialogues and expert consultations on priority areas. Their joint statement noted explicitly that the 3rd Russia-Africa Summit will create the necessary conditions for a new impetus to multifaceted relations and to the future advancement of shared priorities. For the entrepreneurs and stakeholders watching from the ground, the test will be whether this third gathering converts rhetoric into the financing and follow-through that, so far, have been missing.