South Africa's Gas Supply Crisis Looms; 2028 Marks Critical Operational Turning Point

South Africa’s industrial gas supply faces a hard operational deadline. After 2028, output from Mozambique’s Pande and Temane fields will begin declining, triggering what analysts call the “gas cliff.” These fields have supplied roughly 90% of South Africa’s gas for more than two decades. Their depletion threatens not just power generation but the operational backbone of the country’s industrial sector.

The delivery stakes are concrete. Gas flows through the Republic of Mozambique Pipeline Investments Company (Rompco) pipeline into Mpumalanga province, where it powers critical manufacturing infrastructure. Natural gas represents only about 2.5% of South Africa’s total energy supply, but its functional role in industry is disproportionate to that figure. Roughly 35% to 40% of Pande-Temane gas feeds Sasol’s Secunda operations, where the chemicals and energy company converts coal and natural gas into synthetic fuels and chemical feedstocks. Another 35% to 40% supplies Sasol’s chemicals complex at Sasolburg, supporting production of wax, methanol and ammonia. Sasol additionally sells 20 to 23 petajoules of methane-rich gas annually to manufacturers of steel, sugar, paper, pulp and motors across the country.

Additional reference context is available at https://theconversation.com/a-sharp-fall-in-gas-supplies-in-2028-threatens-south-africas-economy-how-to-manage-the-fallout-286861.

The infrastructure implications ripple outward. Globally, natural gas provides roughly 70% of ammonia production and 55% to 65% of methanol production. Ammonia underpins fertiliser; fertiliser underpins food production. In South Africa’s industrial landscape, natural gas keeps furnaces, kilns, boilers and process plants running in steel, glass, ceramics, brewing and synthetic fuels sectors. A reduction in supply would require far more than switching fuels. Affected firms would need to redesign production processes, install new storage and handling systems, absorb substantially higher operating costs, and potentially shift to alternatives with higher emissions profiles.

The Industrial Gas Users Association of South Africa estimates that alternatives such as liquid petroleum gas, diesel or electricity could cost between double and five times current gas prices, before accounting for capital conversion expenses. Industries directly reliant on this gas supply employ approximately 70,000 to 100,000 people. Sasol’s broader economic footprint is larger still: in 2021, the company’s contribution to the South African economy was estimated at about 5% of GDP, supporting roughly 500,000 direct and indirect jobs.

The delivery timeline is unforgiving. South Africa may need 300 to 400 petajoules of gas per year, equivalent to 6 to 8 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas, to meet industrial heating and gas-to-power needs. Current supply is simply insufficient. Delay is not a passive position; it increases the risk of higher prices, weaker industry performance and greater energy insecurity.

Policy frameworks and import infrastructure are advancing, but at a pace that does not match the urgency. The draft Gas Master Plan identifies Richards Bay as a key LNG import location and considers Matola in Mozambique as a regional supply option. Terminal projects at both locations have progressed through permitting, and offtake discussions are under way. Each initiative, though, requires years of work, while the buffer between the country’s current position and where it needs to be has steadily eroded.

Analysis published at theconversation.com identifies LNG imports as the first and most urgent operational option. Research from the Trade and Industry Policy Strategies institution, produced in March 2026, makes clear that South Africa has no choice but to enable LNG imports in the short to medium term. Domestic resources may help later, but they cannot close the near-term gap.

The LNG strategy must be practical rather than symbolic. Durban and Richards Bay, two of South Africa’s most important commercial ports in KwaZulu-Natal, could serve as LNG import terminals, but existing pipeline infrastructure is insufficient to supply inland demand. South Africa therefore needs a second import route via Mozambique, through the ports of Matola or Inhassoro, to connect into existing infrastructure serving the eastern interior. Matola is already more advanced, with permitting and environmental approvals granted.

What this points to is a dual-terminal strategy: one LNG terminal in Mozambique to access Rompco and the inland gas market, and another in KwaZulu-Natal to serve LNG-to-power and regional industrial demand. Both must be secured and operational by mid-2030. Regional and domestic gas sources remain essential but cannot serve as immediate solutions. Timelines, cost, distance from infrastructure and regulatory delays mean current domestic resources cannot rescue South Africa before the cliff arrives.

Demand-side measures also matter operationally. Some users may shift to LPG, diesel, electricity, trucked LNG or compressed natural gas. Biomethane, green hydrogen and electrification may help in time. Many alternatives, however, are expensive, technically immature, logistically difficult or higher-emitting. South Africa’s effective carbon tax, rising from R35 per tonne in 2024 to R115 per tonne in 2030, will not by itself force wholesale substitution.

Execution requires coordinated policy decisions. The Department of Minerals and Energy, regulators, state-owned companies and private investors need a clear LNG-to-power strategy setting out how much gas the country needs, who will buy it, how it will be priced and stored, and how supply can be adjusted as demand changes. The regulatory system needs reform, including clearer rules on what companies must assess before offshore oil and gas projects receive environmental approval and a specialist tribunal to resolve disputes over those approvals.

Above all, South Africa needs a dedicated delivery structure. This could be a new workstream similar to Operation Vulindlela, a government-led initiative designed to modernise the country’s electricity, water, transport and digital communications networks, or a Rompco-style vehicle bringing the state and private sector together, coordinated by a single gas aggregator. A critical review of the situation makes the sequencing plain: decisions must be taken within the next few years to avoid a post-2030 supply shortfall, and many of the required actions carry long development and construction lead times that are highly interdependent. The instruction is direct: decide now, procure now, permit now, build now. Whether the institutions responsible for delivery can move at that pace is the question that will define South Africa’s industrial future.